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Abstract
In Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, the Supreme Court held that religious believers could establish that their free
exercise was substantially burdened just so long as they—or the corporation they had formed—believed that
it was.
This highly deferential stance paved the way for yet another challenge to the contraceptive mandate. In Zubik,
religious organizations (ROs) contend that it is not just subsidization of contraception that can make an
employer complicit in contraception use. Instead, even filling out a form registering one’s objection to the
mandate can do so. The government has responded by vigorously arguing that filling out a form cannot
reasonably be construed as a substantial burden.
One can read the Court’s per curiam opinion as an implicit endorsement of the RO’s claim that the
accommodation process substantially burdens their free exercise. Nonetheless, without a decision on the
merits, it is not clear just why the ROs should prevail on the substantial burden question. Nor do the parties’
submissions provide the needed clarity as the arguments on each side are irredeemably flawed. Or so at any
rate I argue here. I nonetheless believe that there is good reason for ROs to contest the accommodation
process, as it requires that the ROs ratify contraceptive use, in contravention of their religious beliefs. On
these grounds, I find that the existing process imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise. But I also
take seriously the rationale behind the contraceptive mandate and I conclude by seeking to vindicate women’s
rights to free contraception in ways that the ROs should find congenial.
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BURDENING “SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS” 
Amy J. Sepinwall* 
In Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, the Supreme Court held that religious 
believers could establish that their free exercise was substantially bur-
dened just so long as they—or the corporation they had formed—
believed that it was.  
This highly deferential stance paved the way for yet another chal-
lenge to the contraceptive mandate. In Zubik, religious organizations 
(ROs) contend that it is not just subsidization of contraception that can 
make an employer complicit in contraception use. Instead, even filling 
out a form registering one’s objection to the mandate can do so. The 
government has responded by vigorously arguing that filling out a form 
cannot reasonably be construed as a substantial burden.  
One can read the Court’s per curiam opinion as an implicit en-
dorsement of the RO’s claim that the accommodation process substan-
tially burdens their free exercise. Nonetheless, without a decision on the 
merits, it isn’t clear just why the ROs should prevail on the substantial 
burden question. Nor do the parties’ submissions provide the needed 
clarity as the arguments on each side are irredeemably flawed. Or so at 
any rate I argue here. I nonetheless believe that there is good reason for 
ROs to contest the accommodation process, as it requires that the ROs 
ratify contraceptive use, in contravention of their religious beliefs. On 
these grounds, I find that the existing process imposes a substantial 
burden on religious exercise. But I also take seriously the rationale be-
hind the contraceptive mandate and I conclude by seeking to vindicate 
women’s rights to free contraception in ways that the ROs should find 
congenial. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Zubik v. Burwell involves a conscientious challenge not to the subsidi-
zation of contraceptive use, but to the process of opting out of that subsi-
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dization.1 The religious organizations (ROs) appear to “object to . . . voicing 
a[n] . . . objection,”2 and so their challenge has been deemed, not unrea-
sonably, “paradoxical and virtually unprecedented.”3 After all, how can 
opting out of an activity you oppose nonetheless make you complicit in 
that activity? The Supreme Court’s curious per curiam opinion offers no 
answer to that question but it is nonetheless fair to read the opinion as 
implicitly endorsing the claim that the accommodation process did sub-
stantially burden the ROs’ religious exercise.4 Yet, because the Court did 
not address the merits of the legal claims, the reasons for its endorse-
ment—indeed the reasons for which anyone should think there is a sub-
stantial burden—remain obscure. In this contribution, I aim to advance an 
account of complicity that supports the ROs’ substantial burden claim.5 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. 136 S. Ct. 529 (2015). 
 2. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver Colo. v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 
1178 n.25 (10th Cir. 2015). See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, line 13, Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. 
____ (2016) (No. 14-1418) (argued Mar. 23, 2016). 
 3. Id. at 1192 n.47. 
 4. Efforts to speculate about each of the Justices’ positions in a per curiam opinion are notorious-
ly fraught. In this case, however, there are numerous clues that strongly suggest that there were at least 
four, and probably five, votes in favor of the view that there was a substantial burden here. For one 
thing, the Court vacated the six lower courts’ opinions from which the petitioners appealed, all of which 
had found no substantial burden. For another, at oral argument, Justice Breyer seemed to join his four 
conservative brethren in expressing sympathy for the claim that there was a substantial burden. See, 
e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, line 17–63, Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. ____ (2016) (No. 14-1418) 
(argued Mar. 23, 2016); Cf. Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman, & Richard Schragger, Zubik and the De-
mands of Justice, SCOTUSBLOG, (May 16, 2016, 9:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog. 
com/2016/05/symposium-zubik-and-the-demands-of-justice/ (noting astutely that Justice Breyer “is 
now the swing vote in cases where the government wins below”). Finally, the Court would not have in-
structed the lower courts to find a compromise that “accommodates the petitioners’ religious exercise,” 
if the Court did not think the petitioners’ concerns warranted accommodation. Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U. 
S. ____ (2016) (slip op. at 4). Thus, as Michael McConnell writes, the Court’s “‘decision was basically a 
quiet, face-saving, non-precedent-setting defeat for the government.’” Eugene Volokh, Prof. Michael 
McConnell on Zubik v. Burwell (Yesterday’s Supreme Court RFRA / Contraceptive Decision), WASH. POST, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (May 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/05/17/prof-michael-mcconnell-on-zubik-v-burwell-yesterdays-
supreme-court-rfra-contraceptive-decision/ (quoting Michael McConnell). See also Chad Flanders, Sym-
posium: Into the Weeds, SCOTUSBLOG, (May 16, 2016, 3:04PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/sympos 
ium-into-the-weeds/ (arguing that the Court’s opinion should be read as a victory for petitioners on the 
substantial burden question); Erin Morrow Hawley, Symposium: The Return of Chief Justice Roberts, 
SCOTUSBLOG, (May 16, 2016, 5:33 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/symposium-the-return-
of-chief-justice-roberts/ (arguing the same). But see Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, supra (casting 
the decision as a victory for the government). 
 5. I note that I take the ROs’ complicity claim as a good-faith expression of a genuinely and deeply 
held conviction. Others have argued that some of those who raise religious objections to facilitating con-
traception (or abortion or gay marriage) aim not to dissociate from conduct they oppose but instead to 
marginalize, condemn and impede that conduct. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience 
Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L.J. 2516, 2576 (2015); Kath-
erine Franke, Giving Obergefell the “Roe-Treatment,” COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL PUB. RIGHTS PRIVATE 
CONSCIENCE PROJECT, (Jul. 13, 2015), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu 
/publicrightsprivateconscience/2015/07/13/giving-obergefell-the-roe-treatment/. While I find their 
arguments convincing, I nonetheless bracket them here, for my objective is to get clear on what a princi-
pled justification for sincere complicity claims might be. I leave for another day the task of ensuring sin-
cerity, and addressing the more opportunistic or obstructionist claims for exemptions. 
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To be clear, the account I advance is nowhere to be found in the Zubik 
petitioners’6 submissions. Their arguments, I contend here, are unconvinc-
ing. But so too, I maintain, are the arguments on the other side. 
The problem is that both sides are unduly beholden to a causal con-
ception of complicity—i.e., the view that one can be complicit in another’s 
act if and only if one has played a necessary causal role in bringing the 
other’s act about.7 I argue that the current accommodation process does 
not have objectors play a necessary causal role in their employees’ contra-
ceptive coverage. This would seem to sound the death knell for the Zubik 
petitioners.8 But, I contend, to require a showing of causation is to unfairly 
constrain the scope of complicity claims; it is, as the title here suggests, to 
improperly burden RFRA’s substantial burden inquiry.9 For there is a sep-
arate, non-causal ground of complicity, and it alone suffices to implicate 
the petitioners in the conduct they oppose. I refer to that ground as “ratifi-
cation.” Understanding the burden as a matter of ratification allows us 
both to see why the petitioners reasonably believe their free exercise is 
substantially burdened and to evaluate the proffered alternatives with an 
eye to minimizing that burden, even while providing women with free and 
easy access to the contraception to which they are entitled. Both of these 
elements should prove useful should the Court encounter Zubik II, as 
many commentators predict it will.10 
                                                                                                                                      
 6. I refer to the religious non-profit institutions challenging the accommodation process as “the 
Zubik petitioners,” or “the petitioners” for short. Zubik itself consolidates seven cases in which the non-
profits lost in the courts below. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Appeals Courts Now Split on Birth Control Man-
date, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 17, 2015, 8:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/09/appeals 
-courts-now-split-on-birth-control-mandate/. The Eighth Circuit, whose decision is not among those 
consolidated, is the only circuit to have found in favor of the religious non-profits. See id. 
 7. See Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1208 (Baldock, J., dissenting) (“[T]he accommodation scheme 
forces the self-insured plaintiffs to perform an act that causes their beneficiaries to receive religiously 
objected-to coverage.”); Brief for the States of California et. al. at 17, Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 1544 
(2016) (No. 14-1418) (“[T]here is no causal link between the required action and the objected-to result. 
If there is no causation, there can be no substantial burden.”). Cf. Abner S. Greene, Religious Freedom and 
(Other) Civil Liberties: Is There A Middle Ground?, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 185–90 (2015) (arguing 
that the relevant consideration is proximity of causal contribution and adducing several bodies of law as 
support). 
 8. I have elsewhere argued that, for purposes of RFRA’s substantial burden inquiry, courts should 
defer to the religious adherent’s determination that she is complicit, even if her conception of complicity 
is more expansive than the law’s. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for 
Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897 (2015). I do not retreat from that 
position here, but neither do I take the petitioners’ arguments at face value. The fact that courts should 
defer does not entail that we, concerned citizens and scholars, may not criticize the bases of religious 
objectors’ complicity claims. The efforts here seek to engage in just this critical enterprise. 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
 10. Virtually all court-watchers predict that this is not the last of Zubik. See, e.g., Marty Lederman, 
What to Expect from the Zubik Remand: A Possible Solution for “Church Plans,” but Otherwise no Obvious 
Common Ground, BALKINIZATION, (May 17, 2016, 11:03 AM), http://balkin.blogspot. 
com/2016/05/what-to-expect-from-zubik-remand.html; Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, supra note 
4; Michael C. Dorf, Qualms About a (Henry) Friendly Court, DORF ON LAW, (May 18, 2016, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2016/05/qualms-about-henry-friendly-court.html. 
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II. CAUSATION AND COMPLICITY 
The Zubik petitioners’ central concern is that the accommodation 
process requires them to “facilitate” contraceptive provision,11 because 
submitting the form “triggers” a third party’s obligation to perform the ob-
jectionable act in their stead,12 or “highjacks” their plan architecture to get 
the contraception to their employees.13 All of these are causal notions of 
complicity: The petitioners become complicit because they do something, 
or provide something, necessary for the plan beneficiaries to obtain the 
contraception that the petitioners morally oppose.14 
Facilitation is a garden-variety form of complicity,15 so casting the 
accommodation process as a kind of facilitation has the advantage of do-
mesticating the petitioners’ complicity claim. Unfortunately, it also has the 
disadvantage of rendering that claim implausible. The government and 
lower courts persuasively point out that there is no “triggering” since the 
insurance companies providing coverage are already under a pre-existing, 
independent legal obligation to pay for the contested contraception.16 And 
the claim of “highjacking” is at best an exaggeration, and at worst inapt. 
The accommodation does not have the insurance companies completely 
take over and control the petitioners’ insurance plans, which is what the 
highjacking metaphor implies. “Joyriding” would be more accurate, except 
that joyriders temporarily deprive the car’s owner of its use, whereas 
here, the insurance companies’ use of the plan architecture does not pre-
vent the petitioners from using it at the same time.17 Moreover, there may 
be no joyriding at all, for the accommodation process has the petitioners 
effectively consent to the insurance companies’ coming to incur the obliga-
tion the petitioners oppose. Of course, it is just this consent that the peti-
tioners have reason to contest. I shall return to this point below.18 For 
now, it is enough to notice that, if there is consent, there cannot be joyrid-
ing (let alone hijacking). And because whatever consent exists is not caus-
                                                                                                                                      
 11. See, e.g., Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1167. 
 12. See, e.g., Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 237 (D.C. Cir. 
2014); Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.3d 927, 939 (8th Cir. 2015).  
 13. Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: On New Health Care Case, a Single Word May Tell It All, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2016 3:49 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/03/argument-analysis-on-
new-health-care-case-a-single-word-may-tell-it-all/ (noting that the words “hijack” and “hijacking” were 
used seven times at the Zubik oral argument). 
 14. Geneva College v. Secretary U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 435 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
 15. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 166–72 (2000). 
 16. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4); Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 252; Michigan Catholic Confer-
ence & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372, 385 (6th Cir. 2014); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebe-
lius, 743 F.3d 547, 554 (7th Cir. 2014).  
 17. At oral argument, Justice Alito compared the scheme to having the insurance companies infil-
trate the home of the Little Sisters of the Poor and turn one room into a birth control clinic. Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 63, Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. ____ (2016) (No. 14-1418) (argued Mar. 23, 2016). The 
metaphor is different but the notion of conversion of property, and its moral meaning, is the same, and 
so is subject to a similar response: The so-called infiltration would be more like a permission to occupy a 
part of the house where its owner has no intention or desire to spend any time. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
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ally necessary for the insurance companies to step in,19 neither does the 
consent trigger or otherwise facilitate the contraceptive mandate. 
III. (DIS)-ANALOGIES 
If the religious petitioners hamstring their ability to establish a sub-
stantial burden by hewing to causal accounts of complicity, the govern-
ment and Courts of Appeals proceed in ways that unduly advantage their 
side, by cherry-picking analogies that beg the question in their favor. 
For example, the Zubik opponents rely on Bowen v. Roy20 and Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery21 for the proposition that “religious exercise is 
not substantially burdened merely because the Government spends its 
money or arranges its own affairs in ways that petitioners find objection-
able.”22 But Bowen and Lyng govern only if the religious objectors here, 
like the plaintiffs in those two cases, are not themselves put upon to par-
ticipate in the conduct they oppose. Yet the outstanding question here is 
just whether the petitioners are put upon in this way. So to think that 
Bowen and Lyng are apt is already to prejudge the matter. 
Hypotheticals invoking conscientious objectors (COs) to the military 
are similarly flawed. The standard analogy describes a pacifist who not 
only seeks an exemption from the draft but also objects to having some-
one drafted in his stead.23 The objection is unreasonable, the Zubik oppo-
nents contend.24 Instead, not only may the government find a replacement 
for the CO, COs were, historically, required to find or hire their own re-
placement as a condition of their exemption.25 
Here too, though, the analogy falters. For one thing, COs benefit from 
the protection of the military even if they do not participate, so it is fair 
that they be asked to contribute something in return. The Zubik petition-
ers, by contrast, do not benefit from the contraceptive mandate.26 And at 
any rate, our more evolved views recognize that requiring a CO to hire a 
replacement is a “monstrosity,”27 both because it commodifies military 
                                                                                                                                      
 19. The one exception arises in the case of the self-insured petitioners whose complicity I briefly 
address above, see supra notes 5–6. 
 20. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
 21. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). See also Ira Lupu 
and Robert Tuttle, Symposium: Religious Opt-outs or Religious Vetoes?, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 15th, 2015, 
9:33 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/symposium-religious-opt-outs-or-religious-vetoes/. 
 22. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver Colo. v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1184 
(10th Cir. 2015); see also Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 252 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014). 
 23. See, e.g., Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2812 (2014) (Sotomayor, S., dissenting) 
(quoting Notre Dame, 743 F. 3d, at 556). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Brief of Military Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Zubik v. Bur-
well, 135 S. Ct. 1544 (2016) (No. 14-1418). 
 26. Cf. Supplemental Brief for Petitioners at 15, Zubik v. Burwell, 2135 S. Ct. 1544 (2016) (No. 14-
1418) (underscoring that petitioners have moral objections to contraceptive use and so would not en-
dorse any policy that provides it). 
 27. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1214 n.7 (Baldock J., dissenting). 
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service,28 and because it undermines the CO’s ability to meaningfully ob-
ject.29 So the historical precedent is illuminating, if at all, only as a lesson 
in how not to structure an opt-out regime. 
A separate effort to show up the Zubik petitioners invokes the con-
ception of complicity found in the criminal law.30 On that conception, the 
culpable accomplice must not only contribute to a crime but also intend to 
participate because the crime is something he wishes to bring about.31 Ob-
viously, the Zubik petitioners do not want to bring about contraceptive 
use. So, the opponents conclude, the Zubik petitioners are not complicit. 
But it is already begging the question to assume that the criminal law’s 
conception of complicity is relevant. After all, that conception is appropri-
ately narrow, given how consequential a criminal conviction is. Yet moral 
complicity need not be so narrowly construed. The gun merchant who 
sells a weapon to someone he knows will use it in a crime is correctly 
thought complicit in the crime even if he would not be deemed complicit 
under criminal law.32 Here too, then, the Zubik opponents rely on a legal 
frame of reference that unduly stacks the deck against the petitioners. 
IV. RATIFICATION 
Notwithstanding the failure of either side to offer a persuasive argu-
ment establishing that the petitioners are, or are not, complicit, there is a 
rather straightforward, albeit unarticulated, ground of complicity at hand: 
The accommodation process, it might be argued, has the petitioners ratify 
the contraceptive mandate even if it does not have them play a causal role 
therein. 
The notion of ratification at issue here arises where one fails to con-
demn a wrong that one has a moral duty to condemn. To elaborate, there 
are some acts whose moral permissibility we are prepared to see as a mat-
ter about which reasonable minds can disagree. Some people view killing 
animals for food in this way: they believe that it would be a good thing if 
people were to stop consuming meat, but they do not believe that anyone 
is under a moral requirement to do so. Instead, vegetarianism is for them 
supererogatory—over and above the call of duty.33 By contrast, genuine 
                                                                                                                                      
 28. Cf. Michael Sandel, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral 
Limits of Markets 109–14 (May 11–12, 1998). 
 29. See Sepinwall, supra note 8, at 1900 n.90.  
 30. See, e.g., Frederick Gedicks, Symposium: Adjudicating “Substantial” Burdens, SCOTUS 
BLOG (Dec. 14, 2015, 4:06 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/symposium-adjudicating-
substantial-burdens; Brief Amici Curiae of Former State Attorneys General et al., Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. 
Ct. 1544 (2016) (No. 14-1418). 
 31. See Brief Amici Curiae of Former State Attorneys General et al. at 15, Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. 
Ct. 1544 (2016) (No. 14-1418). (quoting Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248 (2014) (citing 
Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949))) (emphasis added). 
 32. Sepinwall, supra note 8, at 1916–17; Kutz, supra note 15, at 166–73. 
 33. See, e.g., Elizabeth Harman, Eating Meat As a Morally Permissible Moral Mistake, in PHILOSOPHY 
COMES TO DINNER (Andrew Chignell, Terence Cuneo & Matthew Halteman eds., 2016). Of course, others 
view vegetarianism as a moral requirement. See, e.g., Tom Regan, The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism, 5 
CAN. J. PHIL. 181 (1975). For at least some of these people, it will be important not just to refrain from 
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wrongs are ones we have a duty not to perform, and a subset of these are 
properly seen as offenses against the moral community as a whole—most 
obviously those acts that count as malum in se.34 We have a moral duty 
not just to refrain from committing malum in se acts; we also have a moral 
duty to condemn them, or at least a moral duty not to blithely assent to 
their commission by others. To do this last would be to ratify the malum in 
se act. Of course, just what should count as a malum in se act can be con-
tested. 
Take for example killing in a just war. A pacifist conscripted to fight 
in a just war will want an exemption from military service. But he may 
well want more than that too. To see this, one need only think about 
Americans drafted into the Vietnam War who burned their draft cards.35 If 
a pacifistic draftee was concerned only for his own moral purity, he could 
have sought conscientious objector (CO) status, and thereby received dis-
pensation from service.36 Why then take the further—and illegal37—step 
of burning his draft card? Presumably because appealing for CO status in 
the established way would have meant business as usual; it would have 
signaled that his objection was an instance of supererogation, not con-
demnation. But if killing in war is a grave moral wrong, this CO cannot 
merely seek to extricate himself, especially if in extricating himself he reg-
isters his assent for the system as a whole. To assent in this way is just to 
ratify war, which contravenes his deeply held moral convictions. 
I submit that the Zubik petitioners’ refusal to go along with the ac-
commodation process is best understood along similar lines. For the Zubik 
petitioners, contraceptive use is an outright wrong, and so not something 
about which reasonable minds can disagree. The Zubik petitioners might 
resign themselves to having lost their battle against contraception in the 
public domain; the government will facilitate access to contraception (as it 
should) no matter what the petitioners do.38 But that does not mean that 
the petitioners need give themselves over to a regime that treats contra-
ceptive use as morally benign. Acceding to the government’s accommoda-
tion process makes them cogs in what they deem to be an abominable 
wheel. Far better (from their vantage point, although not necessarily oth-
ers’), to be a thorn in the government’s side. Only by refusing to go along 
can they avoid the wrong of ratification. 
Insofar as the accommodation process involves ratification, it is a 
species of compelled expression, even though voices on both sides of the 
                                                                                                                                      
meat-eating but also to refrain from ratifying others’ meat-eating, as I use the term “ratify” in what fol-
lows. 
 34. Cf. R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW (2007) (de-
scribing the distinctive feature of criminal law as addressing public wrongs). 
 35. Lily Rothman, This Photo Shows the Vietnam Draft-Card Burning That Started a Movement, TIME 
(Oct. 15, 2015), http://time.com/4061835/david-miller-draft-card/. 
 36. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (allowing conscientious exemptions on moral 
grounds). 
 37. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 38. See infra Part V. 
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debate have denied that there is compelled speech here.39 To be sure, 
what the accommodation compels is not speech supporting contraceptive 
use. But it does compel expressive support for a regime in which contra-
ceptive use is treated as morally benign. And the petitioners cannot in 
good conscience sign on to that expression any more than the war pro-
tester can sign on to the idea that war is morally benign.40 
V. THE LEAST RATIFYING MEANS 
If the best understanding of the petitioners’ complicity claim is as a 
grievance against compelled ratification, then one might conclude that any 
accommodation process will be unacceptable to them because any process 
will involve ratification. But this appears not to be true of the arrangement 
the Court proposed in its order for supplemental briefing.41 On the Court’s 
proposal, the RO would, from the moment it sought insurance, contract for 
a plan that excluded contraceptive coverage, in light of its religious objec-
tion. The insurance company would then notify the plan beneficiaries of 
their right to obtain contraceptive coverage directly through the insurance 
company, with no involvement of the RO at all. This arrangement is not so 
much an accommodation as an exemption insofar as it protects the RO 
from having anything to do with subsidizing contraception. 
The Zubik plaintiffs appear satisfied with this arrangement.42 But it is 
possible that other ROs, not represented in the Zubik consolidated cases, 
would not be.43 And at any rate, most court-watchers are not as sanguine 
as the Court about the prospects for compromise.44 In anticipation of fur-
ther challenges to the government’s efforts to accommodation, it may be 
worth noting one mechanism that does seem to avoid compelled ratifica-
tion. This is the form of notice the Court approved in its temporary stay in 
                                                                                                                                      
 39. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver Colo. v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 
1203–04 (10th Cir. 2015). In a highly subtle and compelling account of the nature of complicity at issue 
in Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, Nomi Stolzenberg argues that the owners’ objection to the contraceptive 
mandate should be construed as an interest in avoiding material, not expressive, support. Nomi Maya 
Stolzenberg, It’s About Money: The Fundamental Contradiction of Hobby Lobby, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 727, 
744–51 (2015). But it strikes me that there is expressive support here—again, not of contraceptive use 
itself, but instead of the normalization of public support for contraceptive use, which the petitioners 
have reason to protest.  
 40. In its Supplemental Brief in Zubik, the government makes plain that it is blind to the expressive 
component of submitting the accommodation form. Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 15, Zubik v. 
Burwell, 2135 S. Ct. 1544 (2016) (No. 14-1418). There, the government describes the arrangement the 
Supreme Court proposed in its Order of March 29, 2016—wherein the petitioners would contract from 
the start for a plan that excluded contraceptive coverage—as being no different from the existing ac-
commodation since both would have the same result: the insurer would subsidize contraception, not the 
religious organization. See id. at 2; see also id. at 11. Crucially, however, both arrangements would not 
have the same process and it is the expressive dimension of the existing process—the ratification it en-
tails—that makes that process reasonably objectionable. 
 41. Order of Mar. 29, 2016, Zubik v. Burwell, 2135 S. Ct. 1544 (2016) (No. 14-1418). 
 42. Id. 
 43. While the Zubik petitioners contend that the Court’s proposal would work even for self-
insured ROs, the government appears doubtful. See Brief for Respondents at 2, 16, Zubik v. Burwell, 
2135 S. Ct. 1544 (2016) (No. 14-1418). 
 44. See supra note 10. 
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the Wheaton College case,45 which requires the religious objector (RO) to 
do no more than inform the government that it objects to the contracep-
tive mandate on religious grounds. The RO need not provide contact info 
for its insurance company, or update the government about changes to its 
plan.46 Because “Wheaton College” notice does not help the contraceptive 
mandate along,47 it might reasonably be seen as nothing other than a 
statement of protest—a kind of “J’accuse!” that signals only that the RO 
wants nothing at all to do with contraceptive coverage. Having been noti-
fied about the RO’s objection, the government could then take steps to en-
sure free and easy access to contraception for the RO’s employees and 
their dependents, leaving the RO out of the matter completely. 
VI. RISKING THE UNDOING OF UNDUE BURDENS 
The foregoing has sought to portray the RO’s complicity claims in a 
sympathetic light. As it happens, however, I strongly support the contra-
ceptive mandate. Thus, I end by offering some thoughts about why and 
how other supporters of the contraceptive mandate should respond to the 
arguments herein. 
First, it is notable that just a few weeks prior to the Zubik arguments, 
the Court heard Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,48 which challenges 
Texas’s restrictions on abortion access.49 Both that case and Zubik turn on 
whether the challenged burdens are substantial.50 So proponents of re-
productive freedom should recognize that they could make common cause 
with proponents of religious liberty by embracing a generous construal of 
“substantiality” in both contexts. 
Second, supporters of the contraceptive mandate are right to insist 
on seamless contraceptive coverage, but not for the demeaning reasons 
they all too often invoke, which portray women as incapable of figuring 
out how to obtain alternative coverage on the exchanges,51 or point to 
their “inertia” when it comes to procuring contraception.52 Seamless cov-
erage is women’s due, not because some women will not take on addition-
al burdens for obtaining contraception, but because no woman should 
have to. Men who want to protect themselves from fathering a child need 
do no more than walk over to their corner drugstore where, without a 
                                                                                                                                      
 45. Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014). 
 46. See Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 
2015). 
 47. Wheaton College, 134 S. Ct. 2806. 
 48. 136 S. Ct. 994 (2016). 
 49. See, e.g., Ariane de Vogue, Liberal Supreme Court Justices Critical of Texas Abortion Law (Mar. 3, 
2016, 9:51 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/02/politics/supreme-court-abortion-texas/. 
 50. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 994; Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 1544 (2016) (No. 14-1418). 
Whole Woman’s Health invokes the substantial burden principle from Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–77 (1992). 
 51. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 51–52, Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. ____ (2016) (No. 14-
1418) (quoting General Verrilli); id. at 72 lines 8–21. 
 52. Id. at 76 (quoting Breyer, J.). 
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prescription and for little cost, they can purchase a pack of condoms.53 
Women who seek to take charge of their own reproductive lives, however, 
already need (at least) a doctor to write and a pharmacist to fill a prescrip-
tion. This is so notwithstanding the fact that at least some methods of fe-
male contraception—”the pill” chief among them—carry risks and side ef-
fects so minimal that medical authorities have recommended that they be 
available over the counter.54 If there is a “less restrictive” accommodation 
method, then, it should not heighten women’s burden further.55 
In sum, the Court should recognize that the accommodation process 
threatens to compel ratification and so imposes a substantial burden. But 
it should protect petitioners from this burden only if doing so is compati-
ble with robust solicitude for women’s right to easy access to free contra-
ception too. 
                                                                                                                                      
 53. See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 54. See American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists, Committee Opinion: Over-the-Counter 
Access to Oral Contraceptives, ACOG (Dec. 2012), http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-
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(Mar. 16, 2016), text accompanying note 37; Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Con-
sent, and the Value of Voluntarism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 583 (2015) (arguing that RFRA should entail a 
genuine balancing between the interests of the religious adherent and the parties whom the challenged 
law is intended to serve). But cf. Kent Greenawalt, Should the Religion Clauses of the Constitution Be 
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less than strict scrutiny under RFRA, given the gravity of exempting someone from a legal requirement). 
